Abstract-When a sensor network is deployed in hostile environments, the adversary may cnmprnmise some sensor nodes, and use the compromised nodes to inject false seming reports or modify the reports sent by other nodw. In order to defend against the attacks with low cost, researchers have proposed symmetric group keybased en-route filtering schemes, such as SEF [l] and I-LHAP [2]. However, if the adversary has compromised a large number of nodes, many group keys can be captured, and the filtering schemes may become ineffective or even useless. To deal with node compromise, the compromised nodes should be identified and the innocent nodes should update their group keys. Some existing intruder identification schemes can he used to identify the compromised nodes, but most existing group rekeying schemes are not suitable for sensor networks since they have large overhead and are not scalable. To address the problem, we propose a family of predktribution and local collaboration-based group rehying (PCGR) schemes. These schemes are designed based on the ideas that future group keys can be preloaded to the sensor nodes before deployment, and neighbors can collaborate to protect and appropriately use the preloaded keys+ Extensive analyses and simutations are conducted to evaluate the proposed schemes, and the results show that the proposed schemes can achieve a good level of security, outperform most previous group rekeying schemes, and significantly improve the effectiveness of filtering false data.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When a sensor network [31 i s deployed in unattended and hostile environments such as battlefield. the adversary may capture and reprogram some sensor nodes, or inject some sensor nodes into the network and make the network accept them as legitimate nodes [43. After getting control of a few nodes, the adversary can mount various attacks from inside the network. For example, a compromised node (intruder) may inject false sensing reports or maliciously modify reports that go through it. Under such attacks. the sink may receive l h s work was supported in part hy the National Science Foundation {CAREER CNS-0092770 and ITR-021971 I).
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incorrect sensing data and make wrong decisions, which may be dangerous in scenarios such as battlefield surveillance and environmental monitoring.
To defend against such attacks, the digital signature-based technique can be used to authenticate and filter false messages.
However, this technique has high overhead both in terms of computation and bandwidth [5], which makes it unsuitable for sensor networks [6] . Therefore, researchers proposed to adopt symmetric cryptographic techniques such as the stalistical enroirte filtering (SEF) scheme [I1 and the interleaved hopby-hop aisflientication (I-LHAP) scheme 121, to address the problem. The basic idea of these schemes is as foilows: Sensor nodes are randomly divided into multiple groups. Nodes in the same group share a symmetric group key and the final receiver (sink) knows all the group keys. Each message is attached with multiple MACs, each is generated using one group key. When such a message is forwarded along a path to the receiver, an en-route node may use its group key to verify the MACs carried in the message. Normally, an en-route node only knows one group key, so it cannot change a passing message or inject a false message without being detected by other en-route nodes who know different group keys. However, if the adversary has compromised a large number of nodes, many group keys may be captured, and the en-router fihering mechanisms may become inefficient or even useless. To deal with node compromises, the compromised nodes should be identified, and the innocent nodes should update their group keys to prevent the adversary from utilizing the captured keys.
To identify the compromised nodes, each node can use the watchdog mechanism [7] [lo] . Wong er al. [ll] , and Balenson et al. [12] can achieve logarithmic broadcast size, storage, and computational cost. However, the communication cost and the rekeying delay are still high when applied io a large scale network. Furthermore, the central controller has to trace the status of a11 nodes, and maintain a large logic tree connecting all the trusted nodes, which incurs high management overhead.
As a distributed solution, Blundo's scheme [131 allows a set of nodes to set up a group key in a distributed way. However. it is still not scalable since the storage cost of each node increases rapidly as the group size increases and each node must know other trusted members in the same group.
To address the drawbacks of the existing group rekeying schemes, we propose a family of distributed and localized group rekeying schemes, called the predissribution and lacal collaboration-based group rekeying (PCGR) schemes. The design of these schemes are motivated by the following ideas: (1) Future keys can be preloaded to individual nodes before deployment to avoid the high overhead of securely and reliably disseminating new keys from a central key server to all trusted nodes at the key updating time. (2) Neighbors can collaborate with each other to effectively protect and appropriately use the preloaded keys; the local collaboration also relieves the high cost of the centralized management. Based on these ideas, we first propose a basic PCGR (B-PCGR) scheme. To address some security limitations of B-PCGR, we propose two enhanced PCGR schemes, i.e., the cascading PCGR (C-PCGR) scheme and the random variancebased PCGR {RV-PCGR). Extensive analyses are conducted to evaluate the security level and the performance of the proposed schemes, as well as comparing the performance of the proposed schemes with some existing group rekeying schemes. Simulations are used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed group rekeying scheme in filtering false data.
The analyses and simulation results show that the proposed schemes can achieve a good level of security. outperform most previously proposed schemes. and significantly improve the effectiveness of filtering false data with low overhead.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section presenrs the system model. In Section III. we describe and analyze the basic PCGR scheme. The enhanced PCGR schemes are presented in Section IV. Section V reports the performance evaluation results. Section VI discusses some issues related to the proposed schemes. Section VI1 concludes the paper.
XI. THE SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a large scale wireless sensor network which is deployed in a hostile environment; e.g., a sensor network deployed in a battlefield for tracking enemy tanks [14] , [151. The network is composed of low-complexity sensor nodes, e.g. the Berkeley MICA mote [16) . which has a processor running at 4 MHz and a 4KB RAM for data storage. These nodes have limited power supply? storage space, and computation capability. Therefore, public key-based operations cannot be afforded. On the other hand, each node has enough space for storing a few kilobytes of keying information.
Node deployment is managed by a central controller (setup server), which is responsible for assigning group keys and preloading some keying information to a node before it is deployed. We assume that each node is innocent before deployment, and cannot be compromised during the tirst several minutes after deployment [17] since compromising a node takes some time. Also, each pair of neighboring nodes can establish a pairwise key using some existing techniques [ 181, [19] , [20] , [21] . When two neighbors exchange some messages for key updating, the messages must be encrypted using their pairwise key to prevent eavesdropping.
To defend against compromised nodes (or outside intruders) from injecting false reports or modifying the reports generated by other innocent nodes, the statistical en-route filtering ( S E ) mechanism [l] is used to detect and drop false messages. We assume that a compromised node can eventually be detected by most of its neighbors within a certain time period. To achieve this, the watchdog mechanism [7] and some collaborative intruder detection and identification schemes [81 can be used. We also assume that nodes are loosely synchronized. and group rekeying is started periodically [221. 
THE BASK

A. Tlie Basic Idea
The €3-PCGR scheme includes the following three steps. 3 I Groirp K q Predislribirtion: Before a node is deployed, it is randomly assigned to a group, and is preloaded with the current and all future keys of the group. The keys are represented by a polynomial called group key yul~noiniul (gpolW7ofI~iaE). Compared to most existing group rekeying protocols, in which new group keys are generated and distributed at the key updating time, the B-PCGR scheme can significantly reduce the communication overhead and the key updating delay, since the keys are preloaded.
2) Local Collaboration-Based K p Prosection: Since all group keys are preloaded, it is important to protect the keys from being exposed to intruders. For his purpose, nodes should not explicitly keep the future group keys. because the keys Cali be captured by an adversary when the node is compromised. Based on the assumption that every node is innocent at least during the first few minutes after deployment, we propose a local collaboration-based group key protection technique as follows:
Each node randomly picks a polynomial, called encryption polynoniial (e-polvnomnial), to encrypt its gpolynomial. We call the encrypted g-polynomial g'-polq'namia 1. Some shares of the e-polynomials are distributed to its neighbors. The node removes its g-polynomial and e-polynomial, but keeps it!! current key and its g'-polynomial.
After the above steps, a node can not access its future group keys without collaborating with a certain number of neighbors, each of which has a share of its e-polynomial.
3) Local Collaboration-Based Group Key Updating: At the time of group key updating. every innocent node needs to receive a certain number of e-polynomial shares from its trusted neighbors. Also, the received shares can only be used to calculate one instance of the e-polynomial which is necessary for computing the new group key. T h i s group key updating mechanism guarantees that a node can compute its new group key as long as it is trusted by a certain number of neighbors; meanwhile. the node can not derive any group keys that should not be disclosed at this time.
B. Detailed Description of B-PCGR
11 Predistribirting g-Pol~aoazials: Initially, the setup server decides the total number of groups. For each group i. a unique t-degree (t is a system parameter) univariate g-polynomial yi(x) is constructed over a prime finite field F ( q ) to represent the keys of the group, where gi(0) is the initial group key, gi(j) ( j 2 1) is the group key of version j . and q is a large prime whose size can accommodate a group key.
Before a node hr, is deployed, the setup server randomly assigns it to a group, and preloads the g-polynomial of the group, denoted as y(z), to it.
2) Encryling g-Polynomials arid Distribirring she Shares of the e-Polymtiiials: After Nu has been deployed and ha5 discovered its neighbors, it randomly picks a bivariate epolynomial where p is a system parameter.
Using the e-polynomial (i.e., e,(z! y)), as shown in Figure   1 (b), ATv encrypts its g-polynomial (i.e., g(z)) to get its g'-potynomial (denoted as g'(z)). The encryption is conducted as follows:
After that, as shown in Figure 1 (c), Xu distributes the shares of e z r ( x , y ) to its n neighbors Ai , , ii = 0 : . . . , n -1).
Specifically. each neighbor NVi receives share e, (rc, ut) . At the same time, N, removes e u ( s , y ) and g(z), but keeps g'(s). The final distribution of g'(a) and e,(z,7ii) is illustrated in Figure 1 (d).
3) Kq UphtiHg: Each node maintains a rekqing rimer, which is used to periodically notify the node to update its group key, and the current version of the group key (denoted as c). Note that c is initialized to 0 when the node is deployed.
To update group keys, each innocent node ATu increases its c by one, and returns share e,,(c, U ) to each trusted neighbor Nvz, Meanwhile, as shown in Figure 2 
C. Security Analysis
The following theorem shows the security property of the 3 Knowing e,(z' : TJ), g ( d ) can be computed as follows:
Similarly, we can prove that: if condition (2) is satisfied, g(r)
can be compromised.
Second, we prove that: if condition (1.1) is satisfied, but condition (1.2) and (2) are no1 satisfied, g(z) can not be compromised. Assume that A' , and its nt 5 p neighbors, i.e., N,; (i = 0 , . . . , RI -I), are compromised. Thus. for an arbitrary x', the adversary can obtain y'(z') and e,(z',vi) 
r IV. ENHANCEMENTS
The B-PCGR scheme is effective on the condition that: (1) no node will be compromised together with 1-1 + 1 or more neighbors, and ( 2 ) the adversary can not obtain t i -1 or more keys from the same group. In some hostile scenarios, the above conditions can be vioIated,. To deal with these limitations, we propose two enhancements.
A. Cascading PCGR (C-PCGR) Schenre
The C-PCGR scheme is proposed to address the first limitation of B-PCGR. In this scheme, the e-polynomial shares of Nu are distributed to its multi-hop neighbors, instead of only to its one-hop neighbors; at the same time, the e-polynomial shares are distributedcollected in a cascading way, and hence does not introduce much communication/storage overhead.
) T h e Scheme:
The C-PCGR scheme is designed based on the B-PCGR scheme, and it also includes three steps.
However, it differs from B-PCGR in the second and the third steps, which are described in the following. To simplify the presentation, we only describe the case where the e-polynomial shares are distributed to its 1-and 2-hop neighbors, while the scheme can be extended to more general cases.
After each node ( N u ) has been deployed and has discovered its neighbors, it randomly picks two e-polynomials: one is called O-lovl e-polyonzial (denoted as eu,o(x: g)), and the other is called 1-level e-polynomial (denoted as e,,l(s, 9 ) ) .
In both e-polynomials, the degree of x and y are t and ,U. respectively.
Using the 0-level e-polynomial (i.e., e,,a(rc, y)), each node Nu can encrypt its g-polynomial (Le., g(z)) to get its g'-polynomial (i.e.. g'(x)). The encryption is conducted as follows:
After that, as shown in Figure 3 . I = e u , o b , U) + e":1(2 -L. 1 (11) After that, Arv keeps el,o(z,v) and e,,o(ctl, U>, which will be returned to N, at the next key updating time. It also removes eu,o(zl P?), and distributes the shares of its 1-level e-polynomial ( e u , l ( z , g ) ) to its neighbors. Figure 3 illustrates how the epolynomial shares of Nu are distributed to its l-hop and 2-bop neighbors.
Key Updating
To update keys. as shown in Figure 4 (a). each innocent node Nu increases its c by one, and returns shares e,, O(c,u) and e , , l ( c ! u ) Figure 4 (a)? N, reconstructs a unique polynomial  c,.o(c, 2:). Knowing e,,o(c, z) . ATu can compute its new proup Having received p+1 1-level e-polynomial shares, as shown in Figure 4 (a), N , 
Random Var-iance-Based PCGR (RV-PCGR) Scheme
The RV-PCGR scheme aims to address another limitation of B-PCGR. Specifically, as shown in Figure 5 (a) , if the adversary has obtained t -k 1 keys of a certain group, e.g., g ( O ) , g(1) , . .. , g ( t ) , the adversary can break the g-polynomial of the group (i.e., g(z)) based on these keys.
I ) Basic Idea:
The basic idea of the RV-FCGR scheme is illustrated in Figure 5 (b) , Let the length of g(j) be 2L bits. We can add a L bit random number (called randm in which the addition operation is defined as modulo-2 addition. Using some techniques (presented next), we can guarantee that the adversary can obtain only g r ( j ) ! not knowing the original g ( j ) .
Based on g ' ( j ) (j = 0, . . . , t), the adversary can construct a t-degree polynomial g r ( z ) , but g'(z) is different from g(z). That is, the adversary cannot break the future keys of the group. Certainly, the adversary may guess each nj and attempts to find out each original g ( j ) ( g ( j ) = g ' ( j ) G M j ] . However. since each a j can be an arbitray number picked from {O, I . . P Ll), the probability of guessing correctly is & l g . Consider an eximple, in which t = 9 and L = 64, the probability is as low as $..5. In the following, the scheme for implementing the above basic idea is described in detail.
2) The Scheme: The RV-PCGR scheme also has three steps.
Redistributing G-Polynomials
Similar to €3-PCGR, the setup server decides the total number ,of groups, and picks a t-degrm univariate g-polynomial for each group. Also, each node Nu is given a g-polynomial
when it is deployed. Different from B-PCGR, each g(z) is constructed over an extended finite field F ( 3 2 L ) , where L is the length of a group key (e.g., 64bit.s). Also, the group key of any version j is defined as the highest L bits of g ( j ) , instead of g ( j ) itself.
Encrypting G-Poly. and Distributing Components
Similar to B-PCGR, after Xu has been deployed and has discovered its neighbors, it randomly picks a t-degree e-polynomial e,(x)'. Using the e-polynomial (~~( 2 ) 'In this subsection, the e-polynomial shares distributed lo a neighhar is randomly constructed. irrelevant to the identity of the receiver. Thus. we can remove the second parameter y in the polynomial eu(z. y) as in B-PCGR. 3) Securily AnoEysis: During the key updaling process, the share returned by each node is added a random variance If the total number of the recorded candidate polynomials is 1, the candidate polynomial is the original y(z); otherwise, one of the candidate polynomials is randomly picked as the guessed ~( 2 ) .
(g'(s) ---g(zj iE e u ( x )
Obviously, the original g ( x ) is among the recorded candidate polynomials. However. the complexity to find out the candidates is as high as 0 ( 3 (~+ ' )~) , For example, if t = 9 and L = 64, the complexity is 2640.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
In this section, we first analytically compare the performance of the proposed PCGR schemes and some previously proposed group rekeying schemes. Then, we conduct simulations to show that the proposed PCGR scheme can significantly improve the performance of filtering false messages.
A. Performance Analysis
Before analyzing the performance of different schemes, we list some notations that are used in this section as follows:
Ai: the total number of nodes in the network.
n: the average number of trusted neighbors that a node 91,: the number of (compromised) nodes that should be L: the length (in bits) of a group key.
1) Cornparing the Pe$ormance of the PCGR Schetnes:
We compare the performance of the proposed PCGR schemes in terms of communication cost, computation overhead, and storage requirement. The main results are shown in Table I . Communication Cost has.
evicted.
In the B-PCGR scheme. each innocent node needs to send out n messages to its trusted neighbors during each key updating process. Each message includes one share, which has I, bits. Therefore, nL bits are sent out by each node.
Similar to B-PCGR, the C-PCGR scheme also requires each innocent node to send out n messages for key updating.
However, the size of each message includes two shares, which has 2L bits. Therefore, each node has to send out 2nL bits.
In RV-PCGR, each innocent node should send out R. shares to its trusted neighbors, and each share has 2L bits. Therefore, each node needs to sent out SnL bits for each key updating.
Computational Overhead
In all three schemes, each share sent/received by a node should be encryptedldecrypted using pairwise keys to prevent eavesdropping, and the total number of messages sent/received is 2n. during each key updating process. Therefore, each node needs 2n encryptionsldecryptions. Next, we discuss other computation overhead of each scheme. ' In the 3-PCGR scheme, each node Nu first needs to evaluate n + 1 t-degree polynomials (e,,(c) (Zn -t-l)t2 + 2p3) 
inultiplicalions/division over F ( q )
In RV-PCGR, each node also needs to evaluate n + 1 t.-degree polynomials to compute n shares and g'(c). However.
after receiving p -+ 1 or more shares, it only needs to add up these shares, instead of solving an equation system. Therefore, the total computational complexity is o( ( n + 1)t') multiplications, However, the multiplications are conducted over field
F(3'L).
To reduce rekeying delay caused by computations, most of the above computations (Le., computing and encrypting shares, as well as computing g'(c)) can be performed beforehand, and only a few other computations (i.e.? decrypting shares and computing e, ( c , U)) should be performed during the key updating time. To distinguish these two types of computational overhead, as shown in Table I , we list both the computational overhead at key updating time and the total computational overhead for each key updating.
Storage Requirements following information:
F ( q ) .
In the B-PCGR scheme, each node Nu needs to store the the g'-polynomial g'(z1, which needs ( t + 1) . L bits to the shares of its neighbors' e-polynomials, i.e., eua(z, U ) store its coefficients.
The total storage requirement is (n + l)(t + 1)L bits.
information:
In C-PCGR, each node Ark needs to store the following the g'-polynomial g'jz), which needs (t + 1) . L bits to store its coefficients. the shares of its neighbors' 0-level e-polynomials, i.e., evr,O(z, U ) (i = 0 , . . . , n -l), which need n. (t + I) . L bits. the shares of its neighbors' l-level e-polynomials, i.e., evi,l(x, U ) (i = 0,. ' . , n -l), which need TI . (t + 1) . L bits.
The total storage requirement is
The storage requirement of the RV-KGR scheme is similar to 8-PCGR. except that each coefficient of the polynomials has a length of 2L. Thus, the overall storage requirement is
S U m m a r y represents the number of (compromised) nodes that should be evicted.
Ln the SKDC scheme, the central controller sends a new key to each trusted node individually. We assume that such a message should go through v%/f! hops in average, and each new key has L bits, Therefore, the total traffic introduced by , and the average size of the data sentheceived by a node is +.
To finish a key updating, each node should receive the new key, which takes o( ( Nn,)+ e / 2 ) units of time. The scheme is efficient in terms of computation and storage. Each node needs only one decryption and stores one key.
When analyzing the LKH scheme, we assume that a binary logic key hierarchy is used. Let s, represent the size of the common ancestor tree (CAT) [24] of the evicted nodes. T h i s scheme requires that each node in CAT should change its key encryption key (KEK) and notify the KEK to its two children (except the evicted nodes). Therefore, ZS, -nc keys should be transmitted. Each node should receive the keys, which results in a rekeying delay of u ( n ) units of time. Also, each node in his scheme should keep logN (the height of tree) number of KEKs, and hence the storage requirement is LlogN. If Blundo's scheme is used for disuibutedly generating a group key for up to N members, each node needs to store and compute a { N -1)-variable polynomial. Assume that the degree of the polynomial is t, the total storage requirement is as high as N(t + 1)L hits.
Comparing our B-PCGR scheme to the previous schemes, we can find that: Every certain time interval (denoted as T~), the adversary can compromise (reprogram) one node and obtain the keys held by the node. After that, the node is put back to the network (with all the keys already compromised by the adversary). Therefore, every r,. the number of compromised nodes is increased by 1, and the number of compromised keys may also be increased if the newly compromised node has keys previously unknown to the adversary. Each compromised node attacks the system by injecring a false report every 10 second (We assume that the intruder is easier to be detected in that case.)
.
of hops traversed by each injected message (before it is dropped) in one second; the control message o~lerlzzead, which is the total number of hops traversed by each control message related to the intruder isolation (identification) or key updating in one second; the total message overhead, which is the sum of injected message overhead and control message overhead.
2) Simulation Results:
We first evaluate the key updating mechanism by comparing the performance of SEF-U to SEF and SEF-1. Figure 6 shows h e results when the key updating interval (T,) is 100 minutes and the node compromise interval ( T~) is 10 minutes. In the figure, a point corresponding to time t refers to the average message overhead during the 10 minute-phase ending at t .
From the figure, we can see that SEF-L and SEF outperform SEF-U at the beginning of the network lifetime. This is due to the reason that there are very few intruders during that period. The message overhead injected by the intruders is small, and the intruder isolation mechanism can effectively deal with the problem. In. this case, if keys are periodicaIly updated, it does not add too much benefit, but increases the message overhead since each node needs to exchange information with its neighbors in order to update its keys.
As the attack continues, the trend is reversed and the SEF-u outperforms the other two. As shown in the figure, the message overhead increases rapidly in SEF and SEF-I. In SEF-u? since the keys are updated periodically, the keys compromised by the adversary become useless after h e key updating. Therefore, the adversary can not continuously accumulate its knowledge about the keys to obtain a large portion or all keys. Certainly, some intruders may remain undetected and can renew their keys. However, these nodes have only one key after each key updating, and hence does not have significant impact.
When the periodical key updating mechanism is used, the total message overhead includes two components: the injected message overhead and the control message overhead (i.e.. the messages exchanged between neighbors for key updating). Figure 7 shows the tradeoff between these two components. As key updating interval ( T~) increases, the average control message overhead decreases. At the same lime, the average injected message overhead increases, since the adversary can compromise more keys to attack the network during each key phase (i.e., the period between two consecutive key updates).
Consequenlly, there exist an optimal T,, at which point the total message overhead is minimized.
From Figure 7 (a), (b) and (c), we can see the impact of the number of groups and parameter T~ on selecting the optimal T~. When the number of groups is 10 and = lOmin, the optimal T, is between 1.50-2.50 minutes. As the number of groups decreases (e.g.. 5), it becomes easier for the adversary to compromise a larger portion of keys and cheat more innocent nodes. Therefore, the injected message overhead increases more quickly and the optimal 7;r becomes smaller (i.e., 100-200 minutes). As T~ increases, i.e., nodes are compromised more slowly, the injected message overhead also increases more slowly. Consequently. the optimal T~ becomes larger (Le., 500-700 minutes).
VI, DISCUSSIONS
A. Dftecting False Shares
In addition to breaking a group polynomial (i.e.: y(z)), the adversary may prevent a normal node from updating its group key by returning false shares. To defend against this attack. a node (say N u ) can keep some sinariires of the correct shares, and use them to defect and filter false shares. For example, the key polynomial e U ( q y) can be constructed as e,(s,y) = a ( z , y ) x d u ( z : y ) + q,(z,y). After distributing shares oCe,(x, y). Nu removes e u ( z , y) and a($, y), but keeps cE,(lc,y) and pu(z:y). Note that Nu can deliberately select cl,(z;g) and g,(z:y) such that most of the coefficients of these polynomials are zero and hence the required storage space is small. Based on &(z, y) and qu(z2 y), AI , accepts a received share (say 2, (c, ,U) ) from a neighbor (Ar,) only if Gu(c,v) 2 qu ((c,vj mod d u ( c , v ) .
B. Node Isolation and New Node Deplovinent
If a large fraction of neighbors are compromised, a node may not be able to update its group key and thus be isolaled. To deal with this problem, some new nodes may be deployed to the isolated areas. After that, each new node distributes shares only to other new nodes to prevent compromised nodes from obtaining its shares. Also, an isolated innocent node can distribute its shares to these new nodes, which can help the node to update its group key and rejoin the network. To enable these operations, each node should be given an initial master key KO before deployment, The key is used only during the first few minutes after deployment and must be removed after that. When a new node distributes a share to another new node, the share will be encrypted with KO to prevent old nodes from obtaining it. Also, a node (say Nu) should use KO to encrypt its e,(z,y) before removing e,(z,y) and KO, and keep the encrypted polynomial. When Nu is isolated later, it sends the encrypted polynomial to the newly deployed nodes.
On receiving the encrypted polynomial, a new node (say N,) can decrypt it, obtain a share e u ( z , U ) . and remove eu(z,y).
C. Olher Issries
In the proposed schemes, group keys are updated periodically. When group keys are being updated in the network, nodes may not be able to send information to the sink since the group keys known by the nodes may not be consistent. To address this problem, information sent during this period should be authenticated using the old group keys.
If a node has many neighbors, it is not necessary to send a share to each of them. As future work, we will further investigate how to determine the number of neighbors that should receive a share. If this number is too small, the node may quickly become isolated, since some neighbors are compromised or failed and it cannot get enough number of shares to update its group key. On the other hand, the security level could be decreased if too many neighbors have received key shares.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a family of predistribrition and local collaborarion-based group rekeying (PCGR) schemes to address the node compromise problem and EO improve the effectiveness of filtering false data in sensor networks. These schemes are based on the idea that future group keys can be preloaded before deployment, and neighbors can collaborate to protect and appropriately use the preloaded keys. Extensive analyses and simulations were conducted lo evaluate the proposed schemes, and the results show that the proposed schemes can achieve a good level of security, outperform most existing schemes, and significantly improve the effectiveness of filtering false data.
In addition to filtering false data, the proposed PCGR schemes can also'be applied to other group rekeying problems, especially for scenarios (e.g., pebblenets [251) where a group has a large number of widely spread members, the membership changes frequently, or when it is very expensive to maintain a central key manager.
